A disputa pelo mar da China Meridional: um reflexo dos dilemas econômicos e estratégicos do sudeste asiático (2009-2018) by Rubiolo, M. Florencia
115
julio-diciembre 2020  ■ ISSN: 1909-3063 ▪ ISSN-e: 1909-7743 ■ pp.115–130







M. Florencia Rubiolo ■ Maria Luísa Telarolli de Almeida Leite
doi: https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.4336
* This article was prepared as part of an ongoing research project at ciecs (conicet) and the Córdoba Catholic Uni-
versity, Argentina.
a  Associate Researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (conicet), Argentina. Ph.D. in In-
ternational Relations (National University of Rosario). Director of the Ph.D. Program in International Relations and 
Professor of International Relations History at the Córdoba Catholic University (ucc). Executive Council Member of 
the Argentinian International Relations Studies Association (aeria). Córdoba Catholic University, Argentina. E-mail: 
frubiolo@gmail.com. orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5669-7332
The South China Sea Dispute: A Reflection 
of Southeast Asia’s Economic and 
Strategic Dilemmas (2009-2018)*
M. Florencia Rubioloa
Abstract: The asymmetric distribution of power in the Asian maritime region is favoring China, increasing the 
apprehension of its neighbors that, faced with their evident vulnerability, fear about Beijing’s intentions. In this 
context, the balance of power maintains the status quo and limits China’s behavior against other coastal coun-
tries. Given the disparity of military and economic power between Southeast Asia and China, this balance can 
only be achieved with the intervention of an extra-regional power, the United States. The renewed American 
participation as a guarantor of regional security has created new bonds of strategic dependence for Southeast 
Asia, which in turn have economies that mainly rely on China. The South China Sea conflict is then posing two 
dilemmas for the region: China’s increasing economic leverage and Washington’s reactive and challenging 
Indo-Pacific policy, which might make a stalemate in the maritime conflict possible.
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La contienda por el mar de la China Meridional: un reflejo de los dilemas 
económicos y estratégicos del sudeste asiático (2009-2018)
Resumen: la distribución asimétrica del poder en la región marítima asiática favorece cada vez más a China, lo que 
aumenta la aprensión de sus vecinos que, ante su evidente vulnerabilidad, temen a las intenciones de Beijing. En 
este contexto, el equilibrio de poder permite mantener el status quo y limitar el comportamiento de China contra 
otros países costeros. Dada la disparidad del poder militar y económico entre el sudeste asiático y China, este 
equilibrio solo se puede lograr mediante la intervención de un poder extrarregional: los Estados Unidos. La reno-
vada participación estadounidense como garante de la seguridad regional ha creado nuevos lazos de dependencia 
estratégica para el sudeste asiático, que a su vez tienen economías que dependen principalmente de China. El 
conflicto por el mar de la China Meridional plantea dos dilemas para la región: la creciente influencia económica 
de China y la política reactiva y desafiante de Washington sobre el Indo-Pacífico, lo que posibilitaría aún más un 
estancamiento en el conflicto marítimo.
Palabras clave: asean; asimetría; política económica; mar de la China Meridional; Estados Unidos
A disputa pelo mar da China Meridional: um reflexo dos dilemas econômicos 
e estratégicos do sudeste asiático (2009-2018)
Resumo: A distribuição assimétrica do poder na região marítima asiática favorece cada vez mais a China, o que au-
menta a apreensão de seus vizinhos que, ante sua evidente vulnerabilidade, temem as intenções de Pequim. Nesse 
contexto, o equilíbrio de poder permite manter o status quo e limitar o comportamento da China contra outros 
países litorâneos. Tendo em vista a disparidade do poder militar e econômico entre o sudeste asiático e a China, 
esse equilíbrio somente pode ser atingido com a intervenção de um poder extrarregional: os Estados Unidos. A re-
novada participação estadunidense como garantia da segurança regional tem criado novos vínculos de dependên-
cia estratégica para o sudeste asiático, que, por sua vez, tem economias que dependem principalmente da China. 
O conflito pelo mar da China Meridional apresenta dois dilemas para a região: a crescente influência econômica 
da China e a política reativa e desafiante de Washington sobre o Indo-Pacífico, o que possibilitaria ainda mais uma 
estagnação no conflito marítimo.
Palavras-chave: Área de Livre Comércio entre a Associação de Nações do Sudeste Asiático e a China — Asean; 
assimetria; política econômica; mar da China Meridional; Estados Unidos
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Introduction
In October 2018, China and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) held the 
first maritime exercise between them in history 
(Parameswaran, 2018). This unprecedented event 
was initially proposed by Beijing in 2015, in a con-
text of increasing tensions in the South China Sea 
(scs) conflict, particularly with Vietnam and the 
Philippines. Most observers understood that Bei-
jing’s gesture was aimed at easing tensions with 
asean members and “also helps promote the image 
of a cooperative and benevolent China” (Ha, 2019, p. 
13), appeasing criticisms over its growing assertive-
ness in the maritime territory. Nonetheless, China’s 
position on sovereignty over this maritime territory 
is unwavering, and the discourse and policies have 
been strengthened in the last years. The conflict is 
currently at the top of Asia’s security agenda and a 
central concern for most asean countries. 
The scs borders southern China and its waters 
are home to more than 400 islands, reefs and sand-
banks, and numerous archipelagos, including the 
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. The con-
tending parties are the People’s Republic of China 
(prc), the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Bru-
nei, and Taiwan. While the prc and Vietnam are 
claimants to the total territory, the other four claim 
parts of it. The overlapping nature of the demands 
in terms of the territory is not new. But the behav-
ior of the claimant governments, mainly the more 
assertive policy implemented by Beijing since the 
last 2000s, has intensified the conflict. The interests 
that support the claims are based, in part, on the 
hydrocarbon reserves that the territory has, as well 
as other natural resources, such as fish. However, 
what distinguishes the scs is its strategic location 
as a commercial maritime transport route. 
Chinese recent foreign policy has shown its un-
wavering will to extend its supremacy in the area, 
not only in discursive terms but through a firm set 
of policies and concrete actions. Since he acceded 
to power, Xi Jinping has implemented a more con-
fident, visible, and proactive international policy, 
showing China’s will to pursue its national interest 
utilizing its growing power (Casarini, 2018; Zhang, 
2015). In the case of the territorial claims, Xi (2015) 
has stated that “the South China Sea islands have 
been China’s territory since ancient times,” rein-
forcing the idea of historic rights over the totality 
of the archipelagos within the “nine-dash line.” 
China’s renewed assertiveness towards the 
maritime territory, combined with its growing 
economic and military power, has fueled Wash-
ington’s interest in the region. Hillary Clinton’s 
speech at the 17th arf in July 2010, showing us 
interest in freedom of navigation and security in 
the scs, was followed by Obama’s administration 
rebalance to Asia policy in 2011, mostly as a sign 
to asean states that the us would be a guarantor 
of their security and to assert its leadership in Asia 
to counterbalance a more powerful Chinese influ-
ence (Cruz de Castro, 2013). 
For Southeast Asia (sea), the maritime conflict 
has several implications. On the strategic dimen-
sion, the intensification of threats to regional se-
curity, along with the increasing Chinese presence 
in the maritime area, is driving the coastal states 
to strengthen their defensive capabilities. There-
fore, the main logic behind the strategic dimen-
sion is the balance of power. There are multiple 
mechanisms to avoid an escalation of open con-
frontation at sea —that mainly asean is trying to 
encourage— but the asymmetric distribution of 
power in the regional sphere favors the prc. In 
this context, given the disparity of military and 
economic power between sea countries and the 
prc, the needed balance can only be achieved 
with the intervention of an extra-regional power. 
Currently, the United States is fulfilling that role 
(Scott, 2012; Yahuda, 2013).
There are also economic implications emanating 
from the territorial controversy. Since China is the 
major economic partner for all sea countries, any 
military policies that could affect Chinese interests 
must be thoroughly weighed in this light. In other 
words, although sea states feel increasingly threat-
ened by the prc’s behavior and rhetoric regarding 
the scs, they cannot afford to challenge its position 
since this could jeopardize their economic benefits. 
In the same vein, Beijing has pioneered several ini-
tiatives to enhance regional confidence and shown 
goodwill and cooperation towards the region, par-
ticularly in the economic realm (Nie, 2016). 
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Therefore, the increasing tensions in the scs 
highlight the relevance of this double dilemma 
for sea countries. On the one hand, the economic 
dimension will become increasingly pressing over 
asean states, given China’s growing economic 
power and presence in most countries, which en-
tails the most frequent use of economic statecraft. 
On the other, the region is facing a more robust 
and strategic approach by Trump’s administration 
through the implementation of the Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific (foip) concept (Storey & Cook, 2018). 
Unlike his predecessor, Trump’s policy on Asia 
Pacific puts China at the center of competition, 
posing a second dilemma for sea states that do not 
wish to confront Beijing. 
In this article, we analyze how the scs dispute 
is reflecting this double logic for sea, through the 
concepts of dependency and economic statecraft, 
from an international political economy perspec-
tive. We take 2009 as the starting year for the study 
since it was when China officially submitted the 
nine-line dash map, which caused deeper appre-
hension among its smaller neighbors as well as a 
more active Chinese policy towards the territory. 
To tackle this central question, we adopt a qual-
itative methodological approach through the anal-
ysis of official documents and trade and investment 
statistics. In the first section, we provide an overview 
of the conflict and the role of the United States and 
China in it. Then we concentrate on the analysis of 
sea countries’ involvement in the dispute and com-
bine it with the level of economic dependence on 
China, which might be used as a tool to condition 
their behavior and decisions. As final thoughts, we 
point out that China’s increasing economic leverage 
in sea and Washington’s reactive and contesting 
Indo-Pacific policy might create a higher possibility 
of a stalemate in the scs. 
Dependency and asymmetry: 
Conditions for economic 
statecraft
The scs conflict has attracted increasing atten-
tion of world scholars, particularly since the es-
calation of tensions started to be more apparent 
around 2010. Focusing on different aspects and 
actors involved, a prolific number of works have 
addressed the topic. 
Scholars tackling the issue from a sea position 
analyze mainly asean’s role in the dispute. From 
an institutional perspective, Emmers (2018) under-
lines how the institution “has sought to preserve 
its neutrality/impartiality on the sovereignty dis-
pute and establish a conflict management mech-
anism that includes all ten asean members and 
China” (p. 363). From a constructivist perspec-
tive, authors as Acharya and Tan (2006) point out 
that the regional organization had a central role 
in “engendering a cooperative security environ-
ment,” as opposed to the balancing role that real-
ists acknowledge to the United States in East Asia 
security, including the scs. In the same vein, Ba 
stresses the importance of asean in encouraging 
multilateralism “in an effort to mitigate Chinese 
influence” (Ba, 2003, p. 646). 
Conversely, from a realist perspective, many 
contributions have been made to the debate on the 
asean’s role in the conflict, underlying the cen-
trality of national security interests and the need 
for a balancer —the United States— to keep a sta-
ble environment and limit Chinese intentions and 
actions. In this line, Southgate and Khoo (2016) 
suggest that “autonomy, sovereignty, and state sur-
vival are reflected in the pursuit of interest con-
vergence between asean states and external great 
powers” (p. 228), thus adopting a state-centric ap-
proach. The authors argue that it was the conver-
gence of national security interests —specifically 
from the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United 
States— that set the basis for a stronger asean’s 
stance to limit Chinese actions in the scs. 
From a state-based perspective of sea claim-
ants, academic analysis has mostly focused on 
Vietnam and the Philippines. They are the ones 
with more compelling interests in the dispute, or 
vanguard states within asean (Southgate & Khoo, 
2016). Regarding the former, most works focus on 
the country’s responses to China’s increasing pres-
ence in the maritime territory from a strategic and 
political view (Hiep, 2015; Lye & Ha, 2018). From 
the Philippines’ perspective, Cruz de Castro (2015) 
made relevant contributions to the analysis of the 
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bilateral relations with the prc in the scs conflict, 
bringing together two approaches —power politics 
and liberal institutionalism— to explain Chinese 
and Philippines foreign policies towards the Scar-
borough Shoal standoff. 
Although the number and variety of approach-
es have grown unprecedentedly since the begin-
ning of the 2000s, there still is a lack of analysis 
that combines the economic and developmental 
perspective in works dealing with sea policies 
regarding the scs. Consequently, our argument 
adopts a political economy approach, particularly 
from a state-centered perspective. We start from 
the conception that the power distribution embed-
ded in asymmetrical economic interdependent re-
lations is central because it is usually taken as an 
advantage by powerful states. In other words, as 
Gilpin (2001) underlines, “economic ties among 
states almost always involve power relations,” 
through the construction of dependencies that are 
politically exploited by the stronger side. Building 
on Hirschman’s argument that economic interde-
pendence entails political dependence, Gilpin also 
points out that states have incentives “to increase 
the dependence of other states upon them through 
such policies as foreign aid and trade concessions” 
(Gilpin, 2001, p. 82). 
In the case of foreign policy, the concept of 
“economic statecraft” also refers to the intrinsic re-
lations between the economic and political spheres 
of international relations.1 The asymmetrical na-
ture of most economic relations, in which a State 
is more dependent on the other, sets the precon-
ditions for the implementation of economic state-
craft. This means that the less dependent state uses 
1  The term, according to Blanchard and Ripsman (2013), 
“refers to an attempt by a sender state to influence a tar-
get state either to do something it would not ordinarily 
do or to forgo an action that it would otherwise engage 
in, by the manipulation of the market in a manner that 
provides economic benefits to states that comply and/or 
imposes economic penalties on those who fail to comply. 
It may involve the direct manipulation of normal bilater-
al or multilateral economic relations, or it may be used 
indirectly, through threats and promises to intervene in 
the economic relationship. The two dominant strategies 
of economic statecraft are economic sanctions (a coercive 
strategy) and economic incentives (a persuasive strate-
gy)” (p. 5). 
economic tools —in the form of incentives or pun-
ishments— to influence the weaker state’s behavior 
in order to achieve political or strategic objectives 
(Blanchard & Ripsman, 2013; McDowell, 2019). 
Wigell and Landivar (2019) add to this idea that 
economic incentives —such as trade agreements, 
loans, and investment in infrastructure, among 
others— are beneficial for the targeted countries 
in the short term, but they can come at the expense 
of political concessions over the long term. In oth-
er words, even incentives can be used coercively 
because once accepted they can be withdrawn as 
a punishment to the receiving state at any time. 
As Hill (2016) underlines, economic statecraft “is 
a question of making some use of what is happen-
ing anyway, through trade, investment or develop-
ment aid” (p. 154). 
sea has always been a strategic region in China’s 
foreign and domestic policy goals and strategies. 
The region is regarded as indispensable for its sta-
ble economic growth, and consequently, Beijing has 
forged close economic, institutional, and aid tie-ups 
with sea countries (Yoshimatsu, 2017). sea states 
also regard China as a key, and today probably the 
most important, player in the regional arena. 
Many authors also sustain the links between 
the economic means and the political and security 
objectives as one of Beijing’s strategy for the region. 
Incentives and punishments are being implement-
ed to influence and/or condition the behavior of 
the weaker regional nations involved. In this sense, 
Li (2017) points out that Beijing has traditionally 
and positively use economic statecraft to gain in-
ternational confidence, improve bilateral relations 
with developing countries, and raise its interna-
tional status. Yet, as Chinese power increased and 
its economic presence became overwhelming, it 
resorted to economic statecraft as a foreign policy 
tool. As Reilly argues, this unprecedented wealth 
has led to more frequent, assertive, and diverse 
use of economic statecraft (Reilly, 2013). There is 
a clear consensus among academics that Chinese 
economic statecraft became more active under Xi’s 
leadership and started to unveil a variety of strat-
egies intended to achieve political goals through 
economic means. A clear example of this trend is 
that the Belt and Road Initiative (bri) —formerly 
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known as One Belt One Road (obor)— already 
considered President Xi’s signature foreign policy 
project (Yang & Liang, 2019). 
In this scenario, with a more assertive regional 
power in the neighborhood, and the renewed inter-
est of the United States to show a continued com-
mitment to the region’s security and stability —to 
cope with China’s growing presence—, sea states 
find themselves then into a double dilemma. While 
China’s growth and economic expansion have gen-
erated increasing benefits to the sea economies, they 
have also become unprecedentedly dependent on 
and vulnerable to Chinese economic policies. The 
bri is also illustrative of this trend, being both an 
opportunity and a threat by reinforcing asymme-
try and dependency links (Dittmer, 2018; Ha, 2019). 
This economic statecraft might can certainly be 
used to pursue political goals, taking advantage of 
the asymmetric distribution of capabilities and de-
pendency conditions that define bilateral relations. 
But, in the strategic realm, sea claimants 
lack the military capability to respond or react 
to Chinese actions in the territory by themselves. 
Therefore, they have sought to strengthen their de-
fense capabilities through external partnerships. 
In varying degrees, all asean states support the 
United States’ strategic engagement in the region 
(Ba, 2016) as a guarantor of stability and securi-
ty, mainly in the maritime area. But us renewed 
engagement in the region has raised concerns in 
Beijing, which interprets the American rebalance 
strategy as intrusive and threatening to its natio-
nal interests. Then, sea states —particularly but 
not exclusively through asean— are constantly 
hedging their foreign policy actions and decisions 
to keep the us partly engaged in the security are-
na, but not to the extent of altering their economic 
relations with Beijing —and the benefits that come 
with them—. The scs then becomes the main sce-
nario where these dilemmas materialize. 
The international ruling and the 
American rebalance
Although the situation in the scs went through 
moments of higher and lower tensions, 2009 
marked a new period of instability. Vietnam 
and Malaysia submitted jointly to the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the 
United Nations (clcs) information on the lim-
its of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles in respect of the southern part of the scs. 
Shortly after, Beijing protested the submission 
through note verbales to the clcs, underlining 
that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent 
waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdic-
tion over the relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof” (Permanent Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the un, 2009). The 
famous nine-dash line map was attached to this 
document and provoked counter-protests from 
Vietnam (Permanent Mission of the Republic 
of Vietnam to the un, 2009). 
The map created greater uncertainty and con-
fusion in the countries that share the territorial 
claim and fueled different speculations due to the 
lack of will or inability of the Chinese government 
to define which claims were included in it (Frav-
el, 2011). This ambiguity has not yet been clarified 
since Chinese officials have not specified whether 
the claims include every feature, the establishment 
of an Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) around the 
islands, and all the resources in the seabed within 
the nine-dash line (Li, 2016). Furthermore, Beijing 
has done little in the strategic dimension to ease 
the anxieties. Instead, some of its actions have in-
creased concerns: the harassment of the Philippine 
chartered energy survey ship near Reed Bank in 
2011; the cable-cutting incidents with Vietnam 
in 2012; and the blockade in 2010 by two Chinese 
vessels of the Philippine Navy in an attempt to pre-
vent the arrest of the Chinese fishermen that were 
illegally collecting corals and other resources near 
Scarborough Shoal (Miks, 2012), which led to a 
ten-week standoff (Baviera, 2016). The most recent 
and world-known skirmish was the one resulting 
from the Chinese deployment in May 2014 of its 
newest and most advanced deep-sea oil rig —the 
Haiyang Shiyou 981— to waters in the Paracel Is-
lands, also claimed by Vietnam (Lye & Ha, 2018).
Chinese military and political determination 
and the change of orientation in the Filipino govern-
ment under President Benigno Aquino paved the 
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way for the decision to file the case against the 
nine-dash line and Chinese acts in the Philippine’s 
eez at the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (itlos) (Baviera, 2016). This was the first 
formal attempt by a claimant country to interna-
tionalize the dispute by seeking a resolution from 
an international legal body. In July 2016, the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration published the tri-
bunal’s arbitration award, ruling in favor of the 
Philippines and against China. According to Parra 
Pérez’ (2017) analysis, the ruling indicated there 
was no legal basis for the Chinese claim on histor-
ical rights over the territory because there was no 
evidence that China had historically exercised ex-
clusive control over the waters or its resources. Bei-
jing categorically rejected the ruling, considered 
illegal and illegitimate since the country did not 
recognize the Court’s jurisdiction over the case 
(People’s Daily, 2016).
Chinese enhanced capabilities, self-percep-
tion of power, and the pursuit to consolidate a 
global-power status have increased the country’s 
self-confidence regarding international relations. 
Also, Xi’s political orientation features a more pur-
poseful and assertive pursuit of China’s national 
interests, reflecting an adjustment in the original 
‘peaceful development’ strategy without abandon-
ing it. As Zhang (2015) argues, the prc still seeks 
and needs to maintain a peaceful external environ-
ment. So, besides the rejection of the ruling, and 
the continued assertive policy in the scs, China 
will refrain from confrontation in the territory to 
maintain good relations with sea countries because 
an aggressive policy could push asean closer to the 
United States (Li, 2016). This could be the case of 
Vietnam, which as a result of increasing Chinese 
pressures in the maritime territory, has strength-
ened its defense ties and partnerships with other 
foreign powers such as the United States, Australia, 
Japan, and India, moving away from its traditional 
‘no alliance’ foreign policy (Hiep, 2015).
As a result of the internationalization of the 
conflict, the growing feeling of insecurity of 
smaller sea states, and the renewed American in-
terest in East Asia, starting with Obama’s Rebal-
ance to Asia strategy announced in 2010, the scs 
has received increasing attention and presence of 
external powers, especially the United States. At 
the arf meeting in Hanoi in 2010, Secretary Clin-
ton stated that: 
The United States, like every nation, has a national 
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for interna-
tional law in the South China Sea. We share these 
interests not only with asean members or asean 
Regional Forum participants, but with other mari-
time nations and the broader international commu-
nity. (Clinton, 2010)
Underlying the main interest of freedom of 
navigation, the United States has increasingly 
engaged in security and military initiatives with 
individual countries and has also backed asean’s 
position. Although some analysts observe that 
the us policy has just been a “symbolic challenge” 
to China’s drawn limits in the contested territo-
ry (Dittmer, 2018), most views highlight Amer-
ican rapprochement to the region as strategic for 
strengthening sea states defense capabilities vis-à-
vis Beijing (Gill, et al.). The us’ growing presence, 
through economic, military, and diplomatic tools, 
has caused apprehension in and responses from the 
Chinese government, which perceives these moves 
as intents to constrain and thwart its own political 
goals in East Asia. But, as Gill et al. (2016) suggest, 
“it also appears that Chinese officials believe that 
its growing material power capabilities will in due 
course convince and persuade its neighbors that 
there is more to gain from working and aligning 
with Chinese interests than from deterring and 
challenging them.”
China’s regional policy: 
Economic statecraft by diverse 
means
As presented previously, economic measures can 
have multiple purposes and be used as incentives 
or punishments. Economic statecraft, as we will 
show in this section, is not only about sanctions 
but also about creating the conditions to generate a 
level of dependence that can potentially be exploi-
ted by the more powerful to influence the weaker 
state’s behavior. 
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China’s policy towards its neighbors, particu-
larly the sea region, went through a drastic trans-
formation during the 1990s and the first years of 
2000s. The Asian financial crisis resulted in a ca-
talyst for further rapprochement between the two 
sides, and along with China’s commitment to the 
financial and economic stability of the region, Bei-
jing started to devise a policy for the region to show 
itself as a responsible and pacific power. This poli-
cy was later known as “peaceful rise/development,” 
originally developed by Zheng Bijian in 2003. The 
need for a stable and peaceful environment as a 
necessary condition for Chinese national develop-
ment is at the core of “peaceful development” and 
became a top priority for successive governments. 
The region became the main objective of this 
“charm offensive.” In words of the Chinese polit-
ical elite: “The Chinese Government is commit-
ted to building good-neighborly relationships and 
partnerships with China’s neighbors. We will take 
concrete steps to promote good-neighborliness, 
friendship and regional cooperation and bring our 
ties with the surrounding countries to a new high” 
(Wen, 2003). This premise is still at the basis of 
China’s regional policy, as recently stated by Presi-
dent Xi Jinping (Reuters, 2015). 
Considering the broad idea that economic tools 
are used to pursue political goals can be regarded 
as economic statecraft, Lim (2017) argues that the 
“charm offensive,” was a type of economic state-
craft. “China’s initial decision to increase its level 
of economic intertwining with Southeast Asia was 
in itself a form of economic statecraft, as part of its 
charm offensive” (Lim, 2017, p. 139). 
This rhetoric of “peaceful development” was 
mainly intended to build confidence within the re-
gion and assure that a stable and peaceful environ-
ment was intrinsically related to China’s national 
interests. To dissipate the “China threat” idea in 
the region, Chinese officials went beyond rhetoric 
implementing a wide range of policies to improve 
bilateral and multilateral relations economically 
and diplomatically. 
China’s engagement with the broader region 
became more apparent after the launch of the 
obor in 2013, which later became the bri. It is a 
comprehensive plan, primarily oriented to reshape 
the country’s environment in order to favor Chi-
na’s continued strong growth. But it is also con-
sidered a political grand strategy to consolidate 
China’s presence —both economic and political— 
in regions considered crucial for securing energy 
supplies, markets for its growing export, sources 
of raw materials, and new destinations for surplus 
Chinese capital. China’s need for support for its 
global initiatives in the context of a dispute with 
the United States is favoring a more pacific and 
committed approach to sea, which constitutes a 
core region within the bri (Poh, 2017). 
But the increasing assertiveness of Beijing re-
garding the scs, particularly since the country 
submitted the nine-dash line map in 2009, started 
to exhibit warning signs across sea. The Chinese 
approach to the scs issue, given the extent and the 
officialization of the territorial claim, the histori-
cal justifications and the actions in the sea —pa-
trolling, building infrastructure in the disputed 
territory, among others— represents a contradic-
tion in its peaceful development and charm offen-
sive diplomacy towards sea (Ba, 2016). 
Beijing’s view of the scs has shifted over the 
decades, as well as the policies implemented and 
the intensity of the rhetoric. Two central pillars 
of the Chinese approach to the issue are bilateral-
ism and the refusal to internationalize the dispute. 
In the first case, asean’s efforts to socialize with 
and engage its giant neighbor with the regional 
security dialogue, particularly the arf, have been 
partly a success. The prc has committed itself with 
asean by signing the Declaration on the Conduct 
of the Parties in 2002, and after years of negotia-
tion of the Code of Conduct, Xi has recently stated 
that they “will work with other asean [countries] 
towards the conclusion of coc consultations based 
on consensus within three years and contribute 
our share to peace stability and welfare in this re-
gion” (Geducos, 2018). This shift means that the 
government understands that multilateral institu-
tions are an effective “soft power” tool to reduce the 
“China threat” perception and, at the same time, 
protect its national interest (Li, 2009). Another 
feature of Beijing’s policy for the scs has been the 
delay strategy (Fravel, 2008). By this, the govern-
ment has sought to maintain the status quo in the 
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dispute, refraining from direct action, maintain-
ing territorial claims through public statements, 
and participating in negotiations, but rejecting any 
commitment or concession. 
This delay strategy favors the prc, particularly 
by buying time for further enhancing its military 
capabilities and enlarging the gap with smaller 
claimants. Hence, from a pessimistic point of view, 
power asymmetries are self-perpetuating, and the 
status quo ends up benefitting the more powerful. 
China’s policies on asean and individual states in 
the scs dispute seem to be following this trend, 
even though Beijing has engaged in different mul-
tilateral security initiatives. Not surprisingly, sea 
weaker states remain concerned about the prc’s 
intentions in the region and the prospects of its 
growing military and economic capabilities. But 
at the same time, they understand that they have 
no choice but to adjust to Beijing’s policies and 
initiatives as the best possible way to contribute to 
the maintaining a peaceful environment, favoring 
China’s domestic goals and their strategic and eco-
nomic security. 
sea: Between economic and 
security concerns
sea economies and development paths have beco-
me closely tied to trade and financial relations with 
China. Given this economic dependence, they 
cannot afford to alter their bilateral relation with 
Beijing, even when facing strategic insecurities de-
riving from the maritime dispute. Though Chinese 
actions in the scs may be considered a threat to na-
tional strategic interests, they do not overshadow 
the centrality of development and economic goals 
that are also at the core of underdeveloped coun-
tries’ national interest and foreign policy priori-
ties. As Beeson and Li (2011, p. 37) indicate, there 
is an inescapable material reality for all states and 
economies of East Asia, and they “must adjust to 
China’s rise in ways that do not jeopardize their 
own economic well-being.” 
Besides the common nature of these concerns, 
the countries in the region have adopted different 
approaches in their relations with China accord-
ing to their level of economic dependence but also 
on the political and strategic interests involved. 
In this respect, Cambodia and Laos, which have 
no claims in the scs and have deep economic and 
diplomatic ties with China —a major source of 
foreign investment and trade partner—, are more 
inclined to endorse Beijing’s interests in the region 
(Emmers, 2018). At the other end of the continu-
um, Vietnam, whose claims largely overlap with 
the Chinese nine-dash line, is showing a more 
confronting response towards Beijing’s policies, 
particularly in the scs. However, due to power 
asymmetry and economic dependence, it has not 
gone beyond tough rhetoric criticizing China (Li-
ang, 2017), although Hanoi has shifted towards a 
closer relationship with the United States in the 
face of Beijing’s bullying actions in the contested 
sea. Vietnam, like all other sea countries, is avoid-
ing open conflict with China, even though their 
territorial interests might be at stake. 
We hereafter introduce common sea concerns 
about their economic overdependence on China and 
the shared interest in diversifying external econom-
ic and political ties as a safer path towards develop-
ment and strategic stability in the region. In doing 
so, we focus on two countries that are the key players 
in the scs conflict: Vietnam and the Philippines. 
Economic ties between China and sea have 
increased and intensified in terms of trade and in-
vestment since the late 1990s. The Asian financial 
crisis represented a unique opportunity for Beijing 
to financially support the region that was going 
through an unprecedented economic turmoil, and 
to demonstrate asean countries how different its 
attitude was towards the crisis in comparison with 
the United States and Japan, their main econom-
ic partners (Khan & Yu, 2013). Chinese economic 
policies —not depreciating the value of its cur-
rency and providing urgent assistance worth $4.5 
billion to the worst-hit countries, with no strings 
attached— helped to ease the pressure on sea econ-
omies and influenced asean’s perception of their 
giant neighbor in the stability and future devel-
opment of the region. Furthermore, the econom-
ic gains that secured political benefits for regimes 
across the region became a crucial driver behind 
the improvement of relations with Beijing (Cho & 
Park, 2013).
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From then on, bilateral trade boosted, under-
pinned by Chinese sustained economic growth 
and industrial development, which reshaped the 
regional political economy, re-orientating almost 
all the sea economies towards a regional produc-
tion network centered on final assembly in, and 
overseas export from, China (Gill et al., 2016). 
Merchandise trade was further facilitated by the 
asean China Free Trade Agreement (acfta) in 
effect since 2010. Emerging as the world’s largest 
Free Trade Agreement with a population of 1.9 
billion and gdp of nearly 8 trillion dollars (Khan 
& Yu, 2013), acfta pushed bilateral trade from 
113.5 billion dollars in 2005 to 439 billion dollars 
in 2017. asean’s economic dependence on Chi-
na is clear when observing the trade numbers: in 
2017 China concentrated 14.1 percent of asean’s 
exports and 20 percent of its imports, consoli-
dating as the region’s main trading partner. The 
share of China’s participation in asean’s foreign 
trade has continuously grown in the last decade; 
in 2010 asean’s trade with China represented 
11.7 percent of its total trade, while in 2017 this 
figure went up to 17.1 percent. Notwithstanding 
that China has been an engine for the economies 
throughout the region, stimulating exports of 
goods and services, the trade balance is increas-
ingly negative for asean. Although the lowest 
figure was hit in 2016, the trade deficit for ase-
an was worth 68 billion dollars in 2017 and some 
estimates for 2018 indicate this trend will rise to 
over 80 billion dollars (asean Stats, 2018; Inter-
national Trade Center [ITC], 2019).
Investments in sea countries are a second in-
dicator that, in parallel to trade, has also shown 
an unprecedented increase in the last decade. Ac-
cording to official numbers, Chinese fdi in asean 
represented 3 percent of total investments in the 
region in 2010; this share almost tripled by 2017, 
accounting for 8.3 percent. The main destinations 
were Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia that ac-
counted for 70 percent of the total Chinese fdi in 
the region. Laos and Vietnam were also important 
receptors of investments. For the former, Chinese 
fdi represented over 90 percent of total investment 
inflows in the country in 2017, which has gener-
ated an overwhelming dependence on Beijing’s 
financial resources.2 Chinese investments have 
also raised concerns in recipient countries about 
the socio-economic consequences —low wages, 
incentives to illegal immigration, exploitation of 
local workers, among others— and negative envi-
ronmental conditions usually related to these proj-
ects (Das, 2018; Gong, 2017).
Most Chinese investments in asean are con-
centrated on infrastructure and are a means to 
increase trade among the acfta participants.3 
They are also related to China’s bri and the Mas-
ter Plan on asean Connectivity 2025 (mpac), and 
both parties have encouraged cooperation in that 
field as stated in the Declaration of asean-China 
Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, in which they 
pledge to “strengthen the strategic partnership 
with mutually-beneficial cooperation […] through 
capacity building and resource mobilization, sy-
nergizing common priorities in the Master Plan 
on asean Connectivity (mpac) 2025 and China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (bri)…” On this occasion, 
asean and China also declared they would inten-
sify efforts to meet “the joint target of US$1 trillion 
in trade volume and US$150 billion in investment 
by 2020” (asean, 2018). 
As shown by these indicators, sea has become 
more dependent on the Chinese market and re-
sources than on any other power within or outside 
East Asia. These elements have generated different 
readings across the region. First, most countries 
conceive that their economic relationship with 
China is an imperative rather than a choice, a per-
ception that will tend to deepen as economic ties 
continue to grow. Second, aware of the possible 
consequences of overdependence, asean states 
have responded by deepening diversification with 
other economic powers and stimulating their eco-
nomic engagement with the region (Gill et al., 
2016). In this sense, diversification of partners is 
considered a strategic tool in the “hedging” poli-
cy of asean, trying to maintain both China and 
the us committed to the region’s well-being 
and development. Finally, sea countries, given the 
2  Prepared by the author with data from asean Stats (2018). 
3  For a detailed table showing the Chinese implemented 
and approved infrastructure projects in asean, see Das 
(2018). 
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asymmetry in their economic and power condi-
tion in relation to China, try to keep the economic 
dimension separated from the security or strategic 
one. This is the case of states facing security chal-
lenges with Beijing, like the ones in the scs.
Vietnam and the Philippines are outstanding 
cases in this respect. Both maintain active claims 
in the scs, as we have previously detailed, and have 
engaged in different skirmishes and legal confron-
tations with Beijing over the last three decades. 
In the case of Vietnam, the bilateral relation went 
through an unprecedented improvement after 
the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1991. 
China represented a unique opportunity given the 
commonalities in economic and political socialist 
models that created a better environment for busi-
ness expansion. During the next decade, bilateral 
relations developed steadily through trade —Chi-
na became Vietnam’s larger trading partner in 
2004— and high-rank diplomatic visits. In 2009 
the “strategic partnership” was upgraded to “com-
prehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” 
enhancing bilateral ties (Hiep, 2015). In terms of 
trade, Vietnam has a strong link to the Chinese 
market: in 2017, Vietnamese imports from China 
concentrated 27 percent of the total, while exports 
to this market accounted for 16 percent (asean 
Stats, 2018). In both flows Chinese participation has 
grown steadily since 2010 to the present, showing 
a trend that will hardly change in a foreseeable 
future. Notwithstanding, some authors underline 
that Hanoi, considering the dangers of overdepen-
dence, has implemented a diversification strategy 
by establishing “15 strategic partnerships and 10 
comprehensive partnerships with major countries 
that are considered critical to Vietnam’s security 
and development” (Hai, 2017, p. 12). 
Vietnam’s approach to China’s challenging ac-
tions in the scs has been consistent with a hedging 
strategy. The asymmetric nature of their power 
and capabilities makes it imperative for Vietnam 
to maintain a foreign policy that, while pursu-
ing its national interests —maintain its sove- 
reignty, territorial integrity, and political auton-
omy— avoids challenging Chinese ones. As Hiep 
(2013) suggests, Hanoi implemented a calibrated 
policy that was further challenged by increased 
economic dependence and a more assertive Chi-
nese behavior regarding maritime claims. Given 
this asymmetric scenario, Vietnam has adopted 
a defensive strategic approach, rather than a de-
fying one towards Beijing in the scs dispute, un-
derstanding that an open challenge could hamper 
economic benefits that are crucial for its economic 
development and political stability. At the same 
time, the government has actively sought to diver-
sify security by establishing defense and strategic 
dialogues with regional and extra-regional pow-
ers —with us and Japan in 2010, South Korea and 
the uk in 2018—, signing mous on Defense Co-
operation,4 and securing financial assistance for 
enhancing military capacities, particularly from 
the us (Hiep, 2015). 
The Philippines, unlike Vietnam, is not a close 
partner of China. In terms of economic ties, Ma-
nila is less dependent on the Chinese market that 
most countries in sea. In 2017, total trade only 
reached 26 billion dollars, which represented only 
6 percent of China-asean trade. For the Philip-
pines, China is the fourth export destination after 
Japan, the us, and Hong Kong but it emerges as 
the first import market, accounting for 17.8 per 
cent of Philippines imports in 2017. The trade bal-
ance is negative for the sea country; in 2017 the 
amount reached 10 billion dollars.5 Regarding in-
vestments, the Philippines are the smallest recip-
ient of Chinese fdi in all asean countries (asean 
Stats, 2018). 
Political and diplomatic relations between both 
countries have not been close and started to deteri-
orate after the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. One 
of the main conditions affecting Manila-Beijing 
relations has been the long-standing defense alli-
ance the insular country has with the United States 
since the beginning of the Cold War. Although 
American military presence lessened after 1992, 
4  In September 2011, the United States and Vietnam signed 
a “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to Promote Bi-
lateral Defense Cooperation,” clearly enumerating five 
areas for close cooperation: maritime security, maritime 
search and rescue, United Nations peacekeeping actions, 
humanitarian aid and defense education, and research 
exchanges.
5  Prepared by the author with data from International 
Trade Center (2019).
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with the rejection from the Philippines Senate to 
renew the lease for us bases in the archipelago, the 
strategic alliance remains vital for both countries 
and constitutes a pillar of East Asian security. A 
new impetus for strengthening defense coopera-
tion came after the Scarborough Shoal incident in 
2012. Besides the fruitless intervention of the us to 
facilitate the negotiation towards a simultaneous 
pullout from the island, Manila drew nearer Wash-
ington after realizing it had lost a territory that had 
traditionally been treated as an integral part of the 
country. In 2014, Washington and Manila signed 
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(edca)6 driven by Philippines concerns over mari-
time security and Chinese assertive behavior. 
The Philippines’ approach towards the scs dis-
pute has been very sensitive to domestic conditions, 
particularly the government’s orientation. While 
during Arroyo’s presidency the tone of the claims 
lowered, seeking a closer relationship with Beijing, 
Aquino’s administration resumed the claims in 
a bitter tone against Chinese actions, reinforcing 
nationalist sentiments within the country. A clear 
example of this radical change was the efforts of 
Aquino’s government to internationalize the con-
flict. Since 2016, under the government of Rodri-
go Duterte, further changes were introduced. The 
new presidency sought to enhance bilateral rela-
tions with China —distancing itself from Aquino’s 
balancing policy— as a strategy to gain economic 
benefits that Duterte considered more vital for the 
country than the territorial claims. As a result, 
the Philippines drew closer to Beijing and down-
played its sovereignty claims, even considering the 
joint exploitation of natural resources in the con-
tested sea (Cruz de Castro, 2016). Economic prag-
matism, linked to the development needs of this 
insular country, has been the main driver of Dute-
rte’s policy on China and the scs. 
6  The agreement entails “a ten-year deal that allows a 
strengthened U.S. military presence in the Philippines, 
with increased rotation of U.S. military personnel and 
assistance devoted to humanitarian and maritime opera-
tions. The deal grants U.S. troops broad access to bases at 
the invitation of the Philippine government and will al-
low for the construction of new and improved facilities” 
(Albert, 2016). 
As shown in this section, all sea states, both 
claimants and non-claimants in the scs, have in-
centives to maintain a peaceful and close relation 
with Beijing, given mainly by economic variables. 
Besides the increasing assertiveness of its behavior, 
China has expanded and deepened interdependent 
ties throughout the region. For the smallest sea 
economies, these interdependent relations trans-
late into a higher level of vulnerability vis-à-vis 
their powerful neighbor that, if it wishes, could 
use these asymmetries in its favor. Eventually, 
economic statecraft will become more frequent as 
China’s might over sea becomes more patent. In 
other words, the economic benefits today will be 
exploited in the future, particularly to seek polit-
ical goals related to the central Chinese interests, 
such as the territorial ones. As of today, some sea 
countries are certainly more vulnerable to China’s 
economic tools (actions, measures) than others.
Conclusion
Economic statecraft, as initially conceptualize by 
Baldwin (1985), entails the possibility of using 
positive and negative economic mechanisms to 
pursue political goals. China, as a rising state in 
East Asia, has usually preferred incentives over 
sanctions or threats to pursue its geopolitical ends 
when dealing with its neighbors. But this behavior 
has started to show some adjustments as Beijing 
perceived the consolidation of its own regional and 
global power status, along with a more proactive, 
visible, and internationalized foreign policy led by 
Xi Jinping’s impetus. The scs conflict is the most 
salient reflection of this reorientation. 
The maritime territory has become the main 
arena for China’s assertiveness in the region. These 
actions present themselves as a radical contrast 
with the ongoing sweeping initiatives of “soft di-
plomacy” the country is displaying throughout 
East Asia. In this scenario, all countries are facing 
difficult choices and seeking to maintain all pow-
ers involved in the economic and strategic regional 
security, mostly directed towards the two big ones: 
China and the us. In this respect, the scs dispute is 
highlighting this sea dichotomy or double depen-
dency. As China continues to increase its power 
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and reduce the economic and military gap with 
the us, sea will probably become more concerned 
about maintaining a friendly and cooperative tie 
with Beijing. 
With the consolidation of a more active In-
do-Pacific policy from the White House and the 
clear assertion that there is a competition with 
China, it is also probable that asean will find it 
more difficult to move closer to the United States 
without sending a counterproductive message to 
Beijing. As a result, the regional states will find 
themselves snared by an unusually complex inter-
linkage of issues —economic and military— that 
will likely result in a stalemate in the territori-
al conflict. This outcome, given the military and 
economic asymmetries between the contesting 
parties, will most certainly benefit the prc as the 
strongest player in the scs dispute.
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